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ARTICLE
Economic Analysis of Legal Institutions:




Barter, the direct exchange of one item for another, is a transaction form
of great antiquity.' Before the introduction of money, the standard by which
the relative value of goods is measured, an individual traded a bundle of
goods in his possession for some other, preferred bundle of goods. Some
have even suggested that in certain early societies barter was not merely an
economic transaction, but also an institution that helped to hold small
communities together by encouraging ongoing relationships. 2
In spite of the important cultural and economic roles of barter in ancient
societies, most early legal systems generally disfavored the enforcement of
executory barter contracts. Presumably this unenforceability impeded the
use of executory barter agreements. Even after money was in general cir-
culation, executory contracts of both barter and sale often remained unen-
forceable, and in certain instances were even considered pernicious.
The development of a flexible and useful executory contract of sale in Rome
has often been applauded as one of the great advances in the legal system. 3 It
is cited as one of the developments in Roman law that fundamentally affected
western law. 4 However, this new development did not affect executory barter
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I. See, e.g., TACITUS, GERMANIA ch. 5, pt. 5, at 48 (ed. 1894) ("interiores simplicius et
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2. See infra text accompanying notes 66-79.
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arrangements, which remained unenforceable until the late classical era.
Thus, executory barter agreements were unenforceable in Rome while exe-
cutory contracts of sale were legally binding. This result is seemingly at odds
with the historical development; one would have exiected the first innovation
to have been followed by a second.
This article resolves this apparent inconsistency. Its thesis does not deny
the role of legal culture in the development of legal values. However, it ex-
plains why the unenforceability of permutatio, the contract of barter,
was sensible under the circumstances. In addition, this article shows how
economics can provide a useful analytical framework for understanding legal
institutions in general.
Section I briefly discusses the institution of barter. Section II describes
the status of barter in classical Rome. Section III evaluates some of the
proffered literary, historic, and anthropologic explanations for the unen-
forceability of the executory barter contract. Section IV shows that the
unenforceability of barter is consistent with the fundamental theorems of
welfare economics.
I. BARTER THROUGH THE AGES
This analysis of barter is premised on three uncontroversial assumptions.
First, money, a fixed standard measuring the relative value of goods, is of
relatively recent invention.5 Second, no person is entirely self-sufficient.6
Third, an individual maximizes his utility; that is, he strives to do as well
as he can with the resources in his possession.7 These assumptions suggest
that early man traded goods before money was readily available.8
A modern individual, who has ready access to currency, may prefer a
barter transaction. Often this preference reflects a preoccupation with the
tax laws rather than with the independent merits of barter. 9 But we no longer
view barter as different from money-denominated exchanges; rather, treating
the distinction between them as insubstantial, we apply the same legal rules
5. See, e.g., A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 23 (money was not introduced in
Rome until around 275 B.C.).
6. See, e.g., J. Donne, Devotions XVII ("No man is an island, entire of itself; every man
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main .. ").
7. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 53 (1985); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 84 (1978).
8. See, e.g., D. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 138 (1978) (citing HOMER,
ILIAD bk. 7, lines 702-05); HOMER, ILIAD bk. 7, line 472; HOMER, ODYSSEY bk. l, lines 184,
431, bk. 15, line 416; see also F. PRINGSHEIM, THE GREEK LAW OF SALE 86 (1950); A. WATSON,
EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 23 ("Until the introduction of coined money [in Rome] around
275 B.C., a barter-type situation must have been the most common type of commercial
transaction." (footnote omitted)).
9. See, e.g., E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 116-21 (1976).
[Vol. 61:401
ECONOMIC ANAL YSIS OF BARTER
to both.' 0 The reason for this is that, although the exchange media in a
modern barter transaction are goods and services, trading parties conceptually
denominate the deal in money." Since all parties to the transaction have
ready access to the money prices of each commodity traded, they are readily
able to translate the exchange into money terms. Thus, the modern barter
transaction is fundamentally unlike that of the ancients, who had no ready
access to money. They could not choose between denominating their trades
in money or in goods, and this influenced their conception of the barter
transaction.
Barter exchanges were common in antiquity but were temporally circum-
scribed. In general, ancient law did not recognize executory agreements.
Trade was considered essentially a marketplace transaction, and the goods
were traded on the spot;' 2 a trade was either complete or nonexistent.,' Even
after money became readily available, most early societies did not recognize
executory agreements.' 4 For example, Athenian law did not recognize sale
on credit. "[U]ntil the buyer paid, the sale had not legally been made and
the land or goods remained the property of the seller."'
5
Some even viewed executory contracts as pernicious. For example, Plato
wrote:
Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary
contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-
making, and the evils... will be greatly lessened in the State.' 6
[In the marketplace, parties] shall exchange money for goods, and goods
for money, neither party giving credit to the other; and he who gives
credit must be satisfied, whether he obtain his money or not, for in such
exchanges he will not be protected by law. 7
II. BARTER AT ROME
Stipulatio
In Roman law, the earliest legally enforceable promise is generally agreed
to have been the stipulatio, a formal promise binding one party unilaterally
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 367 (1860); 33 C.J.S. Exchange
of Property § l(b) (1942).
I. See, e.g., Rev. Rut. 24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (members of barter clubs must report fair
market value of services received in exchange for services rendered).
12. See, e.g., F. PRINGSHEIM, supra note 8, at 87 (executory agreements not enforceable in
ancient societies of Rome, Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, and Germany); see also W. BUCKLAND &
A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 213 (1936).
13. J. JONES, THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS 228 (1956).
14. See D. MACDOWELL, supra note 8, at 138; see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
1162, 1164b; R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 182 (1981).
15. D. MAcDOWELL, supra note 8, at 138. See also J. THoMAs, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN
231 (1975) ("Greek legal systems did not have a consensual sale, only cash sales, and thus an
agreement to buy or sell could be resiled from with impunity by either party.").
16. PLATO, REPUBLIC bk. 8, § 556B.
17. PLATO, LAWS bk. 8, § 849E; see also id. bk. II, § 915.
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to some course of action. 8 Unlike the other enforceable obligations that an
individual could willingly assume, the stipulatio was defined by its form
rather than its function.' 9 The stipulatio was an oral agreement and did not
require any writing to be enforceable. Although its origins are obscure, it
appears to have been available to obligate an individual to any promise that
was not illegal or immoral. 20
When a stipulatio was employed in a commercial context, it probably did
not stand alone; it probably accompanied some reciprocal unilateral under-
taking by the other party. For example, the stipulatio might have been
undertaken in recognition of a past or future service or delivery of goods. 2'
However, it has been suggested that mutual stipulationes were a cumber-
some way by which to transact business. 22 First, the stipulatio had to be
made in the presence of both parties.2a The Romans considered all contracting
parties as principals; they did not recognize the doctrine of contractual
agency, except in the case of sons under paternal control and slaves. Members
of these latter two groups were legally incapable of acquiring property except
for those upon whom they were dependent; therefore, if they did acquire
property, they were deemed to have acquired it for their principals. 24 Thus,
if one wanted to create an enforceable obligation by mail or messenger, the
stipulatio would be useless. 25
Second, even when the parties conducted their business face-to-face, their
promises by stipulatio were unilateral and absolute. A failure by the seller
to perform did not release the purchaser from the requirements of his own
stipulatio.26
Third, because the stipulationes were unilateral, it was difficult for a buyer
to obtain meaningful assurances that the items purchased actually belonged
to the seller and that they contained no latent defects; warranty of title and
18. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 4, 7-8; see also Watson, The Evolution of
Law: The Roman System of Contracts, 2 LAW & HisT. RaV. 1, 4 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Watson, The Roman System of Contracts].
19. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 7-8; Watson, The Roman System of Contracts,
supra note 18, at 4.
20. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 7-8; Watson, The Roman System of Contracts,
supra note 18, at 4.
21. See W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, supra note 12, at 180.
22. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 13-14.
23. See G~Aus, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW bk. 3, § 136; see also A. Watson, The Roman
System of Contracts, supra note 18, at 9.
24. See, e.g., Digest bk. 3, tit. 5, § 14, translated in 3 S. Scor, THE CIVIL LAW 40 (1932);
see also Watson, The Roman System of Contracts, supra note 18, at 9. The Digest is the
comprehensive codification of classical juristic writings that was commissioned by the emperor
Justinian in 530 A.D. One of the primary sources of Roman law, the Digest collects many
older sources, particularly the writings of the principal jurists Julius Paulus (Paul), Gaius,
Julian, Papinian and Ulpian. See W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 20-34, 39-46.
25. See GAIUS, supra note 23, bk. 3 § 136.
26. See id. bk. 3, § 137; see also A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 14. This
necessarily made the creation of reciprocal commercial obligations complicated.
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warranty against latent defect did not accompany stipulatio.27 Stipulatio was
therefore a risky undertaking.
Finally, formal stipulationes between friends performing amicable mutual
services were considered socially unacceptable. The very request for a sti-
pulatio would imply distrust and misgivings. 28 Therefore, stipulatio would
not be used to create legal obligations among friends. In a society composed
largely of small communities, this would necessarily restrict the efficacy of
stipulatio. These aspects of stipulatio rendered it an imperfect vehicle for
creating reciprocal commercial obligations.
Mutuum
Roman law also recognized a form of transaction known as mutuum,
which may have developed as a response to the difficulties associated with
obtaining a stipulatio from a friend or neighbor. 29 Mutuum became a com-
mon form of transaction between neighbors, while stipulatio was used in
the commercial context.3 0 Mutuum, or loan for consumption, allowed one
party to subject another to legal liability without engaging in formal promises
before the act.3' Instead, the legal obligation arose from the very act of
making a loan. Mutuum, applying only to the res quae mutua vicefunguntur,
or readily interchangeable goods,32 arose when one party lent another some
object for the other's use. The obligee was not bound to return the identical
object, but did have to restore to the lender an equivalent quantity of goods
of that kind and quality.13 Since mutuum governed economic relations
among neighbors, it is unremarkable that mutuum did not permit usury:
"friends do not demand interest from friends. ' 34 When a borrower failed
27. A. VATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 13-14.
28. See, e.g., id. at 10, 16-17; see also Watson, The Roman System of Contracts, supra
note 18, at 5-6. Compare A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 10 ("No stipulation would
have been taken precisely because it is morally inappropriate for one friend, performing an
amicable service, to demand a formal contract from another.") with id. at 126 n.13:
In French law any noncommercial (in the technical sense) transaction above a
very small amount can be proved only by a notarial act or a private signed writing
except, under article 1348 of the Code Civil, when it is not possible for the creditor
to procure writing. 'Possible' here refers to moral possibility as well as physical,
and in certain close relationships-such as, at times, those involving one's mother,
mistress, or physician-the obtaining of a writing is regarded as morally impos-
sible.
29. See, e.g., A. WATSON, EVOLUTnoN, supra note 3, at 9.
30. Watson, The Roman System of Contracts, supra note 18, at 5-6.
31. See, e.g., G. D16SDI, CONTRACT IN ROMAN LAW 44 (ed. 1981).
32. W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 462-63 (3d ed. 1963).
33. See GAius, supra note 23, bk. 3 § 90.
34. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 9. Buckland has suggested that mutuum was
rare in classical times and that when it was invoked it was usually accompanied by a stipulatio
for the return of the object. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 463. However, in that case the
1986]
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to repay the loan, the lender, through the action of condictio ob rem data,35
could recover the value of what the borrower had misappropriated and
prevent unjust enrichment.3 6
It has been suggested that mutuum originally applied exclusively to loans
of money, pursuant to the lex Silia, and only later was extended by the lex
Calpurnia37 to other commodities such as grain, wine, oil, bronze, silver,
and gold. 8 This argument assumes that if mutuum had initially applied to
all commodities, including money, then the lex Silia, which provided a
condictio for the return of money, would have been unnecessary.3 9 This
would be the case if the lex Calpurnia did, as some have argued, provide
for the return of all commodities, including money.
This assumption implies, however, that the Romans considered money to
be-one of the commodities covered by the lex Calpurnia. However, it has
been convincingly argued that the Romans did not treat money as a mere
commodity, but as a unique exchange medium.' Therefore, it is not inev-
itable that the lex Silia preceded the lex Calpurnia, for the commodities
reached by the lex Calpurnia may not have included money. Accordingly,
it would not have been duplicative. In any event, the conclusion that mutuum
was enforceable for money before it was enforceable for other goods is not
inevitable if the Romans viewed money and other commodities as wholly or
partially distinct. 4 '
existence of mutuum as an enforceable obligation would be superfluous. Watson's suggestion
may be more appealing. He argues that a stipulatio was added to mutuum only when the
transaction was not among friends. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 9. This stipulatlio
would cover a measure of interest to be charged in connection with the loan-interest that
would be inappropriate to charge a friend. Buckland does agree that it was very common for
the stipulatio connected with mutuum to be for an interest payment: fenus. W. BUCKLAND,
supra note 32, at 463.
35. The Latin phrase "condictio ob rem data" refers to a legal action for the thing which
had been given, for return of the property that had been lent, for restitution. See infra text
accompanying note 51.
36. See W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, supra, note 12, at 174, 181, 237; see also Buckland,
Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common Law, 46 HAiv. L. REv. 1281, 1282 (1933).
37. Lex Silia and lex Calpurnia were statutes, roughly speaking, "enacted" probably before
250 B.C. The lex Silia introduced the form of action when the claim was for a determinate
sum of money, and the lex Calpurnia introduced an action when the claim was for a definite
thing. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 9. It is usually argued that the lex Silia preceded
the lex Calpurnia, although the order of their enactment is disputed. See id.
38. See, e.g., A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 8; Daube, Money and Justiciability,
96 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FUR RECHTSGESCHICHTE 1, 11 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Daube, Money and Justiciability] (on file with the Indiana Law Journal); see also GAIus,
supra note 23, bk. 4, § 19.
39. See A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 8.
40. See generally, Daube, Money and Justiciability, supra note 38.
41. In other words, mutuum originally extended only to money only if money is a subset
of the set of things. This conclusion is not inevitable if the two were regarded as wholly
separate, or as merely partly congruent. This point is important because if mutuum was available
at an early date to cover all commodities, then the distinction between gift-trade and enforceable
contracts becomes less clear. See infra at notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
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Sale
By around 200 B.C. there arose in Rome, for the first time in recorded
history, the possibility of a bilateral, executory agreement. 42 The origin of
this contract is uncertain.4 3 The sale for a price, called emptio venditio,
required no particular formula or language to be enforceable. Instead, the
contract was enforced if it could be shown that both parties had consented.4
In an executory sale contract, the price had to be in money. Otherwise,
the parties' agreement would not be the enforceable contract of executory
sale, but the unenforceable contract of executory barter-permutatio.45 How-
ever, if the parties had agreed upon a money price, they were free later to
arrange to denominate the price in a nonmonetary medium, based on prin-
ciples of datio in solutum.4 6
Solutio was the voluntary extinction of a contractual obligation through
performance of one's part of the agreement. Datio in solutum permitted the
performance of some other act instead of the agreed-upon action as the
prestation. Performance of the substituted act released the party from lia-
bility, provided that both parties had agreed to the substitution. However,
the original obligation could be revived if the substituted performance was
inadequate.4 7
In addition, the money price in sale had to be fixed (certum). It could
not be for a "reasonable" price, or for a future market price. The price
had to be either known or immediately ascertainable at the time of making
the sale contract. However, parties were free to set any price they could
agree upon, so long as they seriously intended it and did not intend merely
to mask a gift.4 8
42. See A. WATSON, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 40 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as A. WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS].
43. G. DIOSDI, supra note 31, at 44-47.
44. See W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 481-85; see also GAIUS, supra note 23, bk. 3, §
136 ("In [sales] contracts consent is said to create the obligation, because no form of words
or of writing (nor any delivery) is required, but the consent of the parties is sufficient. Absent
parties, therefore, can form these contracts; for instance, by letter or messenger; whereas in
Verbal contracts presence is necessary."). This gave sale an obvious commercial advantage over
stipulatio.
45. However, not all the price had to be in money. Like the datio in solutum, see infra
note 47, this legal rule contains within it the potential for overcoming the strictures against
executory barter. See W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 485. Like the "one peppercorn" of
English contract law, perhaps after emptio venditio was developed, the promise of some object
or service, accompanied by the promise of a nominal or fictional sum of money, was considered
sufficient to make a binding contract.
46. See, W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 485.
47. Id. at 564. The potential for evading the unenforceability of permutatio through this
mechanism is obvious. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine how common
such use of datio in solutum was in Rome.
48. B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 174-75 (1962).
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Not only did the price have to be in money, but the objects to be sold
had to be identified, whether individually, or as part of a specified mass or
as one of a number of specific objects. It was, therefore, impossible to have
a sale of generic goods by this method. For example, an executory contract
for ten bushels of "best quality" grain was not enforceable while a contract
for ten bushels from a particular location was.49
Permutatio
Permutatio, barter, became a fully enforceable contract only late at Rome. 0
In earlier times it was enforceable in a limited sense only. It has been
suggested that the remedy for a failure to perform a counter-promise in
permutatio was limited until quite late to a condictio ob rem dati, restitution
of the suing party's performance, or an actio doli, fraud. The protection
of a party's reliance interest may have arisen only later, after Gaius's time,
perhaps in the third century A.D.51 If one party had performed his part of
an agreement for an exchange of goods and services, the other party then
was obligated only to return the former's performance. 52 The performance
could be a transfer, an act, or an abstention.53
Thus, although permutatio was not legally enforceable in its wholly exe-
cutory stages, it could be enforced once one party had performed. Sale, by
contrast, was enforceable before delivery. In effect, the remedies for breach
of an executory barter contract protected only the parties' restitution inter-
ests, returning the parties to the position that they would have occupied in
the absence of the contract.
III. A CULTURAL EXPLANATION FOR THE
UNENFORCEABILITY OF PERMUTATIO
Contemporary legal systems have little difficulty in enforcing an executory
barter transaction.5 4 Barter is considered identical to sale, except for a trivial
difference in the medium of payment. 5 A modern observer is thus perplexed
by the fact that the Roman executory contract of sale was enforceable while
executory barter was not.
49. Id. at 172-73; see also W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAIR, supra note 12, at 213 (the goods
were conceived of as on the spot and in the marketplace).
50. See J. THoMAs, supra note 15, at 247.
51. F. ZULUETA, 2 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 169 (1953).
52. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 523; see also Digest bk. 19, tit. 4, § 1, 14, in S. ScoTT,
supra note 24, at 106.
53. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 521.
54. See, e.g., 33 C.J.S. Exchange of Property § 1(b) (1942); Commonwealth v. Clark, 80
Mass. (14 Gray) 367 (1860).
55. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.
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Professor Watson frames the problem as follows:
For barter between merchants in different places, the only way to make
an agreement for a barter situation was for one of them to send to the
other, often at considerable expense and inconvenience, a dependent
member of his family, such as a son or a slave, to take delivery or
engage in mutual stipulationes. To say that Roman merchants would not
engage much in barter is to forget that the introduction of coined money
into Rome is relatively late, and to say that the Roman merchants would
not find the law relating to barter inconvenient is to render inexplicable
the introduction of such a splendid contract as sale.5 6
Homer
Early commentators were aware of this issue, and attempted to resolve
it. Paul, a Roman jurist,5 7 records a dispute between the two major schools
of Roman jurisprudence. The jurists Sabinus and Cassius had not required
a money price in sale. They argued, quoting Homer, that an exchange
corresponded to emptio venditio (sale) as long as one could distinguish buyer
from seller.5 The Proculians, with Paul in agreement, refused to distinguish
between buyer and seller except on the basis of what they were willing to
exchange. 9 Since both parties to permutatio were trading goods, this dis-
tinction could not be drawn. 60 Therefore, permutatio could tiot fit into the
format of emptio venditio:
[T]he price must consist in a specific amount of money. The question
whether the price could consist in other things, e.g. whether a slave,
land or the toga of another could be the price of a thing, was certainly
debated. Sabinus and Cassius were of the opinion that another thing
could be the price; hence it was that it was quite widely said that sale
is contracted by the exchange of things and that this species of sale is
of the utmost antiquity: by way of argument they adduced the Greek
poet, Homer, who says, in one place, that the army of the Greeks bought
wine for itself in exchange for goods; the lines are: (There the long-
haired Achaeons bought wine, some with bronze, others with shining
iron, others again with ox-hides or oxen themselves and others with
slaves.) But the authors of the other school thought differently and held
exchange to be one thing and sale another: for, in an exchange of things,
it would not be possible to resolve the issue which was to be the thing
sold and which that given by way of price: yet reason will not tolerate
the idea that both are bought and given as the price of each other. The
view of Proculus, holding that exchange is a form of contract in its own
56. Watson, The Roman System of Contracts, supra note 18, at 17. It is possible that this
problem was made less severe through the use of datio in solutum. See supra note 47.
57. Paul, or Julius Paulus, was one of the principal jurists, or legal writers. See supra note
24.
58. HOMER, ILIAD bk. 7, line 472ff. See Daube, The Three Quotations from Homer in
Digest 18.1.1.1, 10 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 213 (1949).
59. They also cited HOMER, ILIAD bk. 6, line 234f.
60. See Daube, Money and Justiciability, supra note 38, at 8.
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right and distinct from sale, rightly prevailed; for it also can call in aid
other lines of Homer .... 61
Legal Culture
The conclusion that permutatio was not the -legal equivalent of emptio
venditio does not, however, explain why permutatio was unenforceable as
an executory agreement. It only explains why permutatio was not enforceable
as sale. 62 Some have attempted to resolve this by reference to the legal culture
of Rome. In Rome, it is suggested, the legal institutions were blinded by
tradition. The unenforceable status of executory barter shows that the en-
forceability of contractual obligations arose, not from surrounding economic
or social circumstances, but from the exposition and development, by experts,
of technical legal issues. 63
Traditions change slowly, it is argued, and useful adaptations often come
late, if at all. Thus, the legal culture may oppose changes in a dynamic
economic or social culture:
[T]he Sabinians, who were conscious of the economic realities, were
bound by the rules of the legal game and could not come out and argue
for more desirable rules for barter: the most they could do was argue
that barter was included within the concept of sale. At no point, more-
over, could they argue for legal change on social or economic grounds.
The Proculians, who may or may not have been blind to the economic
realities, also produced arguments of a purely legal nature for their
successful position. Law is being treated as if it were an end in itself.
This indicates the existence of legal blindness.-
This approach, which may be correct, answers one question while raising
another: why would a new contract of sale emerge while executory barter
remained unenforceable? Why did the intransigent legal culture accept one
change, the enforceability of executory contracts of sale, and not the other,
the enforceability of executory barter? If enforceable executory sale repre-
sented a real innovation in Roman contract law, and if the impetus for its
development arose from outside the formal legal culture, 65 then the legal
culture was not static and resistant to change from outside. In order to
61. Institutes bk. 3, tit. 23, § 2, in J. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 229. See also Digest bk.
19, tit. 4, § 1, in 5 S. ScoTT, supra note 24, at 104-06; Digest bk. 21, tit. 1, § 19, 5, in 5 S.
ScoTT, supra note 24, at 164; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 32, at 485.
62. See Daube, Money and Justiciability, supra note 38, at 8.
63. See W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAIR, supra note 12, at 154-55 ("An agreement is not a
contract unless the law, for some reason, erects it into one.").
64. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 24 (footnote omitted). On the other hand,
even today many jurists argue from precedent, and turn to explicit policy arguments only as
a last resort. See generally O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); cf. Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 572-73
(1984) (legal scholars often overlook the realities of a situation).
65. See G. D16SDI, supra note 31, at 44; see also A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3,
at 13 (sale arose in part because of the inadequacy of stipulatio).
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distinguish permutatio from emptio venditio in the terms of this legal-culture
argument, one must be able to identify a cultural difference between the
two forms of transaction. Since contemporary western culture regards the
difference between barter and sale as trivial, the difference may seem elusive
to modern observers. The legal-culture school, therefore, seeks to persuade
moderns that the nature of barter as a cultural, as distinct from economic,
institution militated against its enforceability.
Gift-Exchange and the Legal Culture&
In a small community that does not use money, the work force is likely
to work in common. Since no one is entirely self-sufficient and since no
money is available with which to purchase labor services, each man's work
product is likely to be the result of joint effort:
The fisherman on his return will want and expect his neighbours to help
him pull his boat on to the shore; the farmer will need friends to help,
both with labour and implements, in getting the harvest in before the
weather turns bad; roofs of huts are much more easily put on with the
labour of several men. Help is freely given, because few can be self-
sufficient. Times when help is needed come frequently: often with reg-
ularity, but also often irregularly and unforeseen.67
Under such conditions of communal endeavor, it is unremarkable to
observe the development of rules to govern the participation of individual
community members in the joint effort:
Although rules may be invoked, they are often "open-ended," allowing
considerable flexibility in reaching an agreement on the rights and wrongs
of the case and on the compensation to be paid. In societies where there
are no courts, it is generally not possible for disputes to be determined
through the strict application of a rule .... Dealings between people
are marked by a constant exchange of various types of property. Often,
the particular relationship of the parties determines the sort of property
to be given and the occasions on which it should be given. The point is
that obligations would be conceived in highly specific and concrete ways
connected with the transfer of property. What in modern law would be
called the consensual contract, in which an obligation to deliver property
arises from an agreement concluded between individuals, is unknown.
The relationship between the parties derived from kinship or marriage
imposes obligations to make gifts. Where there is no such bond between
the parties, a relationship may be initiated through the making of a gift.
66. This section draws heavily upon Daube, Money and Justiciability, supra note 38, and
A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts with Especial Reference to Roman Law (unpublished
manuscript) [hereinafter cited as A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts] (on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
67. A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66, at 2.
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Receipt of the property imposes an obligation to make an appropriate
return at some time in the future .. ..
As a result, the survival of this structure depends on good faith. Thus,
the members of this community have no interest in exacting a precise equiv-
alent for a rendered service; imprecision permits the flexibility necessary to
respond to future needs. Community members desire to create in one another
a generalized feeling of obligation, so that when the fisherman needs help,
he can expect assistance from the farmer whom he had aided at the last
harvest:
It is the very width of choice of expectation and return that makes
contract undesirable. When you ask me for a service, what I may want
in return need not be a similar service. At the time of my performance
in fact it will often not be known what I may expect from you. And I
will not be expecting a calculated equivalent: I may in time be looking
for more or less. Each service, indeed, will not be seen as a unit, separate
from all other services. What I am looking for in return is often just
your generalised willingness to be of help to others including me.-
Not only is a contract arguably undesirable in this situation, it is also
impossible. The parties do not know what help they will need in the future,
so they do not know what terms to create. In the place of explicit contracts,
status in the community is the mechanism that ensures that the members of
the community act with due regard for these generalized expectations. "[O]ne
who habitually gives more than others will rise in status; those who do not
pull their weight will lose respect." ' 70 Moreover, there are other reasons why
members of a small community would not "cheat"; everyone knows that
someday he will need help from his neighbors:
7
'
Most people carry out their agreements because they carry out their
agreements, not because awful things will happen to them if they don't.
But equally important, even within an imaginary society which had...
68. MacCormack, Anthropology and Early Roman Law, 14 IRISH JURIST (n.s.) 173, 175-
76 (1979).
69. A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66, at 3. Cf. ARISTOTLE, NicoM-
ACHEAN ETHICS 1162, 1163a, 1164a, 1164b. See also Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 343, 349 (1972):
Perhaps one gives good things... in exchange for a generalized obligation on the
part of fellow men to help in other circumstances if needed .... Actual behavior,
as reflected in decisions of democratic governments, shows that individuals are
in fact willing to sacrifice present satisfactions for future generations, as in the
case of public investments, or even for others living in the present, as evidenced
by willingness on the part of middle-class citizens to vote for county hospitals
while they in fact use voluntary hospitals.
70. A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66, at 3. See also MacCormack,
supra note 68, at 174 (early relations governed by status, not contracts); ARISTOTLE, NIcoMA-
CHEAN ETHICS I163b.
71. Thus, Posner can fairly characterize gift-exchange as self-insurance. R. POSNER, supra
note 14, at 150-63.
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no legal enforcement, there would still be a powerful source of non-
ethical, rational impetus toward repayment. Assuming that trades in-
volving temporal performance differentials are functional in the society,
the power to take part in such transactions has value. It follows that
exclusion from that system, or a disproportionally high entrance cost,
both of which would follow from a reputation for default, is a species
of rational economic coercion.7 2
Professor Watson suggests that in some instances the parties would desire
to create a binding contract. 7 1 In these cases, Roman law would enable them
to do so by stipulatio. Likewise, if one desired to recover goods that had
been lent, mutuum or commodatum would provide sufficient remedies.
"These, however, are the exceptional cases." 74 It is at least arguable that
the communal nature of barter influenced the legal culture, and prevented
permutatio from becoming enforceable without the solemnity and formality
of a stipulatio.
Watson observes that, except for the contract of partnership (societas),
every recognised Roman contract either demands that the counter-pres-
tation be in money as in sale or hire, or be gratuitous or unilateral as
in stipulatio, loan for consumption (mutuum), deposit and loan for use
(commodatum). Moreover, money is the touchstone which determines
which contract is involved; mandate deposit and commodatum all become
hire if a money reward is demanded; sale ceases to be a contract and
becomes the legally ineffective arrangement of barter (permutatio) if the
price is not to be in coined money.2
Thus, existing parallel to the system of money-denominated contracts is a
group of contracts concerned with gratuitous and friendly actions. This
disparate treatment of money-denominated and "friendly" agreements sup-
ports the thesis that gift-exchange principles influenced the legal status of
permutatio.76
72. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J.
1, 27 (1970) (footnotes omitted). See also Arrow, supra note 69, at 354 (ethical behavior
operates to fill in the gap where the market fails to convey information).
73. A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66, at 4.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 4-5; see also Daube, Money and Justiciability, supra note 38, at 10-11; Watson,
The Roman System of Contracts, supra note 18, at 3.
76. Although Watson advances this theory as a possible explanation for the unenforceability
of permutatio, he recognizes the difficulties involved with relying upon it as a sufficient
explanation:
First, intimate contracts not involving money prestations, such as deposit and
loan for use, were recognized, provided always that they were gratuitous. Secondly,
barter between merchants would be much less intimate than the modern examples
Daube suggests, especially in the days before coined money. For the absence of
these transactions from the list of contracts one must add to the fact of no
prestation in money the legal tradition that recognized only the stipulatio as a
contract except when sufficient pressure arose in a very specific type of sitation
for the acceptance of a derogation from the stipulatio. Except when money was
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This cultural explanation is, however, inadequate to explain the peculiar
status of permutatio. Several initial observations about the relationship be-
tween gift-trade and money may be made. First, there is no reason why
money transactions should lie outside the realm of gift-exchange. Presumably
one could treat a loan of money as equivalent to a "gift-exchange loan" of
fish if there exists a large money-denominated market for fish. Repayment
of the fish loan would not necessarily involve future delivery of the identical
number of fish, but could take the form of assistance in the repair of the
fisherman's nets. The repayment of the money loan could take the same
form. This would be nothing more than an exchange of labor for a wage.
Also, the gift-exchange thesis does not explain why permutatio allows for
an action for restitution of the objects tendered. Seemingly that remedy also
should be barred as not part of the realm of gift-exchange.
Second, just as the existence of money is not necessarily an obstacle to
the giving of gifts, it does not necessarily destroy the relationships created
through the giving of gifts. The fact that one party to a transaction has
been paid in money or in kind for services rendered to the other party does
not bar the first from seeking the assistance of the other some time in the
future. 7
Third, the nexus between traditions surrounding gift-trade and the law
regarding permutatio is not obvious. By hypothesis, gift trade is neither an
instantaneous nor a wholly executory exchange. Rather, gift trade occurs
when one party performs a service for, or gives some object to, another.
As has been seen, the legal culture was willing to intervene in this circum-
stance to compel the party receiving the item either to return it or to perform
his side of the bargain. Thus, the form of agreement that resembles gift-
exchange more closely than does executory barter was enforceable in early
Rome. It is therefore difficult to argue that the essentially intimate nature
of gift-exchange necessarily prevented executory barter from becoming en-
forceable.
Fourth, the legal-culture thesis does not explain why the ancients would
be unable to distinguish between gift-exchange and commercial transactions.
Watson has argued that the Romans would employ stipulatio when they
involved, that pressure was greater where the obligation was seen to be obviously
friendly, involving trust, hence gratuitous.
A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 25 (italics added).
Some have suggested that barter was a mechanism enforcing the social norm of gift exchange.
The Romans, it is said, chose this inefficient mechanism to bring about the greatest possible
social welfare. This is to say that the Romans maximized social welfare by choosing a Pareto
inefficient market equilibrium. Unfortunately, this thesis cannot be accepted because a Pareto
inefficient equilibrium cannot be socially optimal. See infra note 97; see also R. POSNER, supra
note 14, at 157-62.
77. But see A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66, at 8.
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desired to enforce an otherwise unenforceable arrangement. Presumably they
also could have distinguished between gift-trade and permutatio.7
Gift-exchange was probably not performed self-consciously. "The more
fundamental an institution-fundamental in the sense of embedded in the
fabric of society-the more apt it is to be accepted without ado and to
remain unformulated. '79 Rather, it was considered a manifestation of com-
munitas-community or sense of fellowship. To say that the members of a
community do not consciously engage in gift-exchange with the object of
creating reciprocal obligations does not imply that they are unable to detect
an overtly commercial transaction. Neighbors often borrow among them-
selves, but if one decides to charge interest on his loans, the other will surely
notice. They might continue to trade back and forth, but would almost
certainly recognize that a commercial element had been introduced into their
friendly arrangement, and would probably adapt to account for it.
Those who would understand the unenforceability of executory permutatio
principally as an inefficient or counterintuitive effect of the force of the
Roman legal culture face other problems as well. One can, for example,
argue that it was prohibitively difficult for the Romans to permit anything
more than restitution damages for breach of permutatio.0 It has already
been observed that the Romans would not enforce a contract for generic
goods.8' Rather, a sales contract, to be effective, had to be for particular
casks of wine, or for particular bushels of grain.
Suppose that, before money became available, Servius promised three casks
of wine to Marcus, but instead delivered them to Varrus for a silver goblet.
If Marcus has given Servius nothing, he has suffered no injury that restitution
damages would recompense. He has, however, incurred harm to his expecta-
tion and perhaps to his reliance interest since he failed to get the wine. Yet,
since the agreement was for those three casks of wine, and not for generic
wine, he can only be compensated by taking the wine back from Varrus. Ex-
cept for his having dealt with Servius later than did Marcus, Varrus "deserves"
the wine as much as Marcus. He may even deserve it more, since he actually
paid the price for it while Marcus gave only his word. In this situation it
is unclear that Marcus should be preferred to Varrus. The difficulties are com-
pounded if Varrus has drunk all the wine.
Arguably, most commercial agreements that fail to take place founder
because one party either has negotiated a better deal, or because something
78. Posner recognizes that, to be effective, gift-exchange as a form of insurance must be
limited to "a group whose members know and continually interact with one another and have
broadly similar abilities, propensities, character, and prospects." R. POSNER, supra note 14, at
154. Accordingly, there would be no dynamic reason to apply principles of gift-exchange to a
purely commercial transaction.
79. Daube, The Self-Understood in Legal History, 18 JURID. REv. 126, 132 (1973).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
81. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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else has made him unable to perform. In either instance the goods are
probably unavailable. Since without money no money damages are possible,
and since generic goods were not an appropriate part of a sale contract, the
Romans may have found it impractical to protect a party's reliance and ex-
pectation interests in a wholly executory barter agreement.
IV. THREE ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR
THE UNENFORCEABILITY OF PERMUTATIO
If the role of the legal culture is not a satisfactory explanation for the
unenforceability of barter, then what explanation is satisfactory? Why would
the Romans, who had achieved a great innovation by enforcing the executory
contract of sale, not enforce an executory barter contract? The equivalence,
after all, of two unilateral contracts of sale and one bilateral barter contract
must have been as apparent to the Romans as it is to us. The legal-culture
school has explained this anomaly by reference to the force of legal tradi-
tion:8 2 the history of barter is related to that of gift-exchange 3 and the
unenforceability of gift-exchange was a norm too deeply embedded in the
legal culture to be altered. Although we have raised certain criticisms of this
claim, 84 we do not dispute that, if true, the legal-culture thesis sufficiently
explains the unenforceability of executory barter contracts.
Although sufficient, the legal tradition thesis is not necessary to explain
this difference. The unenforceability of barter can also be understood as the
result of certain economic principles working in Roman society. The validity
of the economic analysis does not depend on the Romans' ability to un-
derstand modern economic theory. 85 In fact, it would be remarkable if the
Romans used the language of modern economics in discussing barter. How-
ever, two claims can be made. First, if the economic concepts implicit in
the economic explanations are self-evident to modern observers, who do not
participate in a barter economy, 86 then, a fortiori, they would have been
known by Roman observers, who actually dealt with the practical and the-
oretical problems of barter. Second, there is some evidence that the economic
82. See generally, A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66.
83. See generally Daube, Money and Justiciability, supra note 38.
84. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. One additional criticism which will arise
from our analysis relates to Watson's interpretation of the debate between the Sabinians and
the Proculians. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. Watson concludes that the
Sabinians did not leave the realm of legal nicety because they were tethered to the status quo
by the formalistic legal culture of Rome. A. WATSON, EVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 21-22. We
would argue that they did not look outside the legal structure itself precisely because to do so
would be to concede the issue to the Proculians: the "economic realities" of barter, as will be
seen, weigh in on the Proculian side.
85. Similarly, the anthropological explanation of cultural behavior does not depend upon
the subjects' understanding of anthropological analysis.
86. A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66, at 6-8.
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concepts underlying these three explanations were known, albeit by different
names, by observers of the barter economy of antiquity.87
We thus introduce three economic explanations for the unenforceability
of permutatio: bounded rationality, asymmetric transaction costs, and the
coin-miller's profit. All three economic theses originate outside the legal
culture of Rome and are, instead, inherent in the economic nature of a
barter economy.
Bounded Rationality
Human imperfection is well known.88 Among the many constraints within
which humanity must operate is a limitation on the ability to process in-
formation. This limitation can be characterzied in "neurophysiological"
terms: "The physical limits take the form of rate and storage limits on the
powers of individuals to receive, store, retrieve and process information
without error." 89 This limitation accounts, in part, for the ability of rational
human actors to behave in ways which seem, in retrospect, irrational. The
concept of bounded rationality refers to decisionmaking which is "intendedly
rational, but only limitedly so."' 9 Bounded rationality is a condition different
from the failure to obtain correct information. Bounded rationality is the
failure to accurately evaluate whatever correct information is available.
For those who have experienced the complexity of the world and have
made errors in trying to master it, the concept of bounded rationality is not
a startling one. For example, if rationality were unbounded, no one would
87. It is arguable Aristotle was aware that the introduction of money alleviated the problem
of bounded rationality. See ARISTOTLE, NicoiCtmAN EAIcs 1133a ("All goods must therefore
be measured by some one thing . . . this [thing] is in truth demand, which holds all things
together ... but money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand .... ).
It may also be the case that Paul was aware of the problem of transaction costs, which he
indirectly addressed in this remark on money as a store of value:
The origin of purchase and sale is derived from exchanges, for formerly money
was not known, and there was no name for merchandise or of the price of
anything, but every one, in accordance with the requirements of the time and
circumstances exchanged articles which were useless to him for other things which
he needed; for it often happens that what one has a superabundance of, another
lacks. But, for the reason that it did not always or readily happen that when you
had what I wanted, or, on the other hand that I had what you were willing to
take, a substance was selected whose public and perpetual value, by its uniformity
as a medium of exchange, overcame the difficulties arising from barter, and this
substance, having been coined by public authority, represented use and ownership,
not so much on account of the material itself as by its value, and both articles
were no longer designated merchandise, but one of them was called the price of
the other.
Paul, Digest bk. 18, tit. 1, § 1, in 5 S. ScoTT, supra note 24, at 3.
88. "Lord, what fools these mortals be." Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act
III, sc. 2, line 115.
89. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIEs 21 (1975).
90. Id. (quoting H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (1961) (emphasis deleted)).
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play chess; the game would be trivial. 9 In the absence of information
processing constraints, each player would be able to identify the game's
extensive form; that is, each could specify a complete map of the game's
moves and countermoves. Because each player would know the game's
outcome for each sequence of moves, the game would be no more interesting
than tic-tac-toe. The latter game is so simple that its extensive form can be
easily mastered by both players; the result is stalemate. Rationality with tic-
tac-toe is unbounded; the game is not interesting, and only children play it.
But chess is an interesting game, enjoyed by cerebral adults. The reason for
this difference is that no human can master a game tree as massive as that
required to specify the game of chess. 92
Chess and barter share the problem of bounded rationality. Just as the
players of chess face a bewildering complex of possible moves, barter traders
must consider an enormous array of exchange ratios. Imagine a small hy-
pothetical economy of only ten goods. Even under such simplified circum-
stances, the number of exchange ratios that each trader must know is
prohibitively large.93 The number of ratios increases as the square of the
91. J. VON NEUMANN & D. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
125 (1953).
92. Each pairing of move and countermove, assuming 30 alternatives, involves 1,000 pos-
sibilities. If full consideration of even one move is thus improbable, exhaustive examination
of the complete game tree is impossible: for a 40-move game, 10 '12 possibilities would have
to be considered. J. SIMON, supra note 77, at 166.
93. The number is 45. In general, the number of ratios in an N-goods economy is (N)(N-
1)(1/2). For N = 10, (N)(N-l)(l/2) = 45. The second term involves the subtraction of the
number one because, for any vector of exchange ratios, one good is always numeraire; that
is, the exchange ratio of a good for itself is one. The third term involves division by two
because a complete array of exchange ratios is redundant. If one knows the corn-to-wheat
ratio, one need not also know the wheat-to-corn ratio.
A graphical representation of the fact that the number of exchange ratios in an N-goods
economy is (N)(N-1) is found below. Each of the empty cells in the two-person, 10-goods array
represents one exchange ratio. Note that the number 90 = (N)(N-l) for N = 10. Each trader
needs to know only half of these ratios (since he's not trading with himself), so each trader's
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number of goods. Thus, to double the number of goods is to roughly
quadruple the number of ratios.Y And to increase the number of ratios is
to increase the probability of error.
The introduction of money into such an economy has an unambiguously
simplifying effect. The one-to-many relationship between the number of
goods and exchange ratios is replaced by a one-to-one relationship. For a
ten-goods economy, the number of money prices is only ten. As the number
of goods increases, the number of prices increases in a one-to-one fashion;
with twenty goods, there are twenty prices. Thus, relative to pure barter
exchange, money exchange decreases, as the square root of the number of
goods, the amount of information traders must know in order to trade.
With these decreases in the number of ratios comes a decrease in the prob-
ability of error.
Thus, intuitive economics tells us that money simplifies market exchanges,
loosening the bounds on rationality. This is important because bounded
rationality prevents two barter traders from achieving a Pareto efficient 95
trade; that is, a third party, whose rationality is not bounded, could step
in and adjust the barter trade in such a way that the adjustment leaves one
trader indifferent and the other measurably better off.96 In the absence of
When money is introduced into the economy represented above, the number of ratios is













94. For N = 20, (N)(N-l)(1/2) = 190 = (4)(45) + 10.
95. Pareto efficiency can be defined as the state where "[t]here is no feasible allocation
where everyone is at least as well off and at least one agent is strictly better off." H. VARIAN,
supra note 7, at 145. See generally V. PARETO, MANUEL D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (1909).
96. In the diagram below, two parties, A and B, with indifference curves, IA and IB
,
respectively, start at endowment e. A maximizes his utility by moving "northeast." B maximizes
his utility by moving "southwest." During a previous year, A and B had achieved a Pareto
efficient exchange of goods X and Y at point Z, where the exchange ratio is represented by
vector P. During the current year, A, erroneously and to his disadvantage, picks the exchange
ratio represented by vector P'. He gives up the amount A YA, he gave up in the previous year,
but gets back less (XA' instead of XA). The current equilibrium is found at G. By inspection
it is clear that this equilibrium is not an element of the Pareto set represented by locus L.
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bounded rationality, and barring other sources of market failure, the two
traders would achieve a Pareto efficient trade without the help of the third
party. It would then be impossible for the third party to step in and improve
the position of one of the traders without hurting the other. The trade
consummated by the two traders would therefore be the best trade available,
given the initial endowments of the traders. 97 As a matter of public policy,
Pareto efficient trades are desirable because Pareto efficiency is a necessary,
though not a sufficient, condition for the optimization of social welfare. 98
This is easy to see by considering a two-person society. If it is possible
to make one person better off without making the other person worse off,
then the social welfare of the society is suboptimal. This is true regardless
of the norms of the society and the distribution of resources within the
That G is Pareto inferior is made clear by the fact that a third party could intervene and
enforce the transaction at H, where A is better off and B is just as well off. A and B will not
renegotiate to achieve the Pareto efficient equilibrium J because, by the nature of bounded




97. The efficiency of markets is not being proposed as a normative standard. The Pareto
efficiency criterion, see supra note 95, defines as optimal an allocation of resources such that
no central authority could disturb the allocation without making at least one party to the
allocation worse off. This definition says nothing about the initial resource distribution; barring
market failure, Pareto efficiency can be achieved again after any' redistribution of resources.
For the purposes of simplicity, we assume that the Romans did not use the legal system to
redistribute resources. We, therefore, restrict our inquiry to the question of whether, with
respect to barter, the legal system sought a Pareto efficient result given an initial distribution
of resources.
98.'See H. VARIAN, supra note 7, at 152-54.
[Vol. 61:401
ECONOMIC ANAL YSIS OF BARTER
society. So, whatever its goals, any society would hope to achieve a state
of Pareto efficiency.
In order to understand the effect of bounded rationality on a Roman
trader, imagine that the trader lives in a tiny twenty-goods economy and
holds nine goods that he is willing to trade. Presumably this trader is willing
to trade these nine goods only for some or all of the eleven goods that he
does not hold. The trader's goal is to determine the composition of a package
that is equivalent in market value to the nine-goods package he holds.
Otherwise, he will be unable to tell whether or not his trade is the best
available.
In order to determine this' &quivalency, the trader must know ninety-nine
exchange ratios, eleven for each of the nine goods he holds. Even if both
the ratios and the eleven desired goods were easily obtained, the trader would
have to perform ninety-nine calculations in order to exchange his package
of nine goods for a package of the other eleven goods in the economy. The
performance of ninety-nine calculations is not mind-boggling. It is, never-
theless, sufficiently difficult that error is possible. If a trader holding 100 goods
lived in a 1,000-goods economy, 90,000 calculations would have to be per-
formed and error would be almost inevitable. As the number of ratios in-
creases, so does the probability of error.
A trade resulting from this sort of error would be Pareto inefficient. For
example, imagine the following scenario. During a previous year, two traders
consummated an exchange of commodities in quantities reflecting the market
exchange ratio. Between that year and the year of the current trade, re-
markably, none of the factors affecting the first exchange ratio changed.
But, one trader misremembers the exchange ratio of the previous year. The
other party to the trade therefore enjoys an unanticipated windfall at the
expense of the party-in-error. This trade is Pareto inefficient because an
omniscient third party could preserve the windfall, in terms of utility, of
the lucky party while improving the position of the party-in-error. 9
Assuming only that a goal of Roman law was social-welfare maximization,
the undesirability of enforceable executory barter agreements is clear. Since
the socially adverse effects of bounded rationality are reduced as the number
of exchange ratios is reduced, a social-welfare-maximizing legal system would
take whatever steps it could to reduce the number of exchange ratios. One
such step in Rome was the move from the cumbersome formal requirements
of stipulatio to the more streamlined emptio venditio. One would not expect
the momentum from this great innovation to carry the Roman legal system
toward the enforceability of permutatio in its executory form because the
enforcement of executory permutatio would offset the positive social-welfare
effects of emptio venditio. In stark contrast to that of emptio venditio, the
enforceability of permutatio in executory form would have been Pareto
inefficient.
99. See supra note 96.
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Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are the costs associated with bargaining, whether or not
denominated in money. These costs could derive from such sources as the
time value of bargaining, transportation costs, or the costs associated with
strategic behavior.' °° Kenneth J. Arrow has shown that transaction costs
lead to inefficiencies only when asymmetrically allocated.' 0' If both parties
to a transaction incur equal transaction costs, their position relative to one
another is unaffected; but if transaction costs are unequal, relative position
is affected.
According to the Coase Theorem,'0 2 when transaction costs are positive
and asymmetric, not every legal rule will yield a Pareto efficient equilib-
rium. 10 3 A central authority choosing legal rules and hoping to maximize
Social welfare will, therefore, inevitably tend to choose the legal rule that
minimizes the effect of asymmetric transaction costs. The ultimate example
of this would be the choice of a legal rule which eliminates asymmetric
transaction costs. As will be seen, the refusal to enforce permutatio is such
a choice.
If the cost of acquiring information, for example, is imposed asymmet-
rically, an otherwise efficient market becomes Pareto inefficient. Because
money represents stored value, ' °4 the buyer of one good who wishes to sell
100. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market
Versus Nonmarket Allocation, U.S. CONG. SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMY IN GOV'T, JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 91ST CONG., IST SESS., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE
PPB SYSTEM 47, 48 (Joint Comm. Print 1969).
101. Id. at 51.
102. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
103. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-13 (1983):
[The Coase Theorem] is most easily explained by an example. Consider a factory
whose smoke causes damage to the laundry hung outdoors by five nearby residents.
In the absence of any corrective action each resident would suffer $75 in damages,
a total of $375. The smoke damage can be eliminated in either of two ways: A
smokescreen can be installed on the factory's chimney, at a cost of $150, or each
resident can be provided an electric dryer, at a cost of $50 per resident. The
efficient solution is clearly to install the smokescreen since it eliminates total
damages of $375 for an outlay of only $150, and it is cheaper than purchasing
five dryers for $250.
.... If there are zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur
regardless of the choice of legal rule.
.... [But suppose] it costs each resident $60 to get together with the others
.... If the residents have a right to clean air ... [t]he factory would again
purchase the smokescreen, the efficient solution. If the factory has a right to
pollute, each resident now has to decide whether to bear the losses of $75, buy
a dryer for $50, or get together with the other residents for $60 to collectively
buy a smokescreen for $150. Clearly, each resident will choose to purchase a
dryer, an inefficient outcome.
See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 35 (1977).
104. See A. Watson, The Prehistory of Contracts, supra note 66, at 7-8; R. DORNBUSCH &
S. FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 218-19 (2d ed. 1981).
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a second good need not buy the first good from the person to whom he
sells the second. This buyer is able to buy from a seller who has no interest
in buying whatever good the buyer holds. The seller, in turn, is able to sell
to a buyer who cannot or will not sell the good which the seller wishes to
buy. The transaction cost of acquiring information is positive but symmetric
in this money-denominated market. Thus, absent another sort of market
failure, the transactions are Pareto efficient.
Consider, by contrast, the barter economy. The holder of wheat, for
example, must find a party who not only desires wheat but also holds corn,
the good desired by the holder of wheat. If these two parties find each other
on the first try,'05 the transaction cost of acquiring information, though
positive, is symmetric. The relative transaction cost is zero, so, by the Coase
Theorem, the legal rule does not affect the Pareto efficiency of the trade.
But suppose the holder of corn does not desire wheat and is not as anxious
°6
to trade his corn as the holder of wheat is to trade his wheat. This might
happen for the simple reason that the holder of corn prefers, as a matter
of taste, other commodities to wheat. In such a situation, the holder of
wheat would be more likely than the holder of corn to incur the cost of
finding an exchange commodity. The holder of corn might, for example,
have indicated his desire for fish. The holder of wheat would then be induced
to seek a holder of fish who desires wheat. Even if the very first holder of
fish discovered by the holder of wheat agreed to the trade, the holder of
wheat would have incurred an information gathering cost not incurred by
the holder of corn. The transaction costs are thus asymmetric.
This asymmetry provides the holder of wheat with a loss, in the form of
a transaction cost, which does not correspond to a gain to the corn holder.
The loss is simply waste with respect to this corn-wheat trade. This barter
trade is Pareto inferior to that of the money-denominated market; the trade
can be improved by an omniscient third party.' 7
It is important to realize that the barter equilibrium is not necessarily in-
ferior to the money equilibrium in terms of fairness; the same Pareto efficiency
arguments would be made if the disadvantaged trader was, for example, a
105. How does each know the other trader holds the desired good? It does not matter; each
obtains this information in the same way and at the same cost as the money-denominated
trader.
106. Such anxiousness might be reflected in the exchange ratio, as it would be in the price
in a money economy, but this effect does not include the impact of transaction cost asymmetries.
107. In the figure below, the holder of wheat, A, and the holder of corn, B, with indifference
curves IA and I respectively, start at endowment e. Cf. supra note 96. The holder of fish is
not directly represented in this flat, two-dimensional diagram. Instead, a lump-sum tax, t,
imposed on A serves as a proxy for the role of the fish holder. So P' = t + P. The tax, t, is
not reallocated to B, but is removed from this two-person economy altogether; the tax is,
therefore, wasted. The physical quantities traded are represented by the Pareto efficient point
Z. But since A has lost t, the value of his trade is only G, which is Pareto inferior. A and B
cannot renegotiate to a Pareto efficient point, such as H or J, because t has been entirely
removed from the economy.
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holder of contraband or a holder of enormous wealth. To address either of
the latter two situations, a social-welfare-optimizing central authority would
not choose a Pareto inferior equilibrium but a different Pareto efficient
equilibrium.
As in the case of bounded rationality, one must only assume the existence
of a social-welfare-maximizing central authority at Rome to understand the
public policy implications of asymmetric, positive transaction costs. In re-
fusing to enforce permutatio in its executory form after the recognition of
emptio venditio, the Roman legal system resisted the Pareto inferior effects
of the former while embracing the Pareto efficiency of the latter. The refusal
to enforce barter encouraged the use of money and thereby facilitated the
attainment of Pareto efficient trades.
The Coin-Miller's Profit
Two complementary reasons for the introduction of money into the barter
economy have been presented: the Pareto inefficiencies of bounded ration-
ality and transaction costs. There is a third reason independent of the first
two: a government which issues money enjoys an interest-free loan.'08
108. A government need not be the party to issue money. Since a unit of money is merely
a note payable to the bearer, any party may effectively issue money, if such issuance is not
[Vol. 61:401
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A modern government raises money for public expenditure by two means:
taxation and borrowing. One modern method of borrowing is to issue a
bond and to pay interest to the bondholder. By this method the government
pays for the use of bondholders' assets. A second modern method of bor-
rowing is to increase the currency stock. The essence of this method is
captured by the image of the government milling coinage to spdnd on public
projects. The government, by virtue of its special position as the producer
of currency, apparently enjoys an enormous advantage over its citizens.
What is the nature of this advantage? Surely it is not the case that the
government, as coin-miller, enjoys costless consumption. Were this the case,
currency would become so abundant as to be valueless; the currency system
would be abandoned.'09 The government's consumption would not, therefore
unlawful. Bank notes served as money in the United States even during the nineteenth century.
See M. FRIEDMAN & A.J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960
(1963); Stevens, Composition of the Money Stock Prior to the Civil War, 3 J. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING 84 (1971). Governments, as this section of the text illustrates, can enjoy interest-
free consumptioh by issuing money and thus are induced to forbid other parties from doing
so. Furthermore, government-backed money is less risky, absent the threat of invasion or civil
war, than private money. Risk-averse holders of notes may, therefore, seek to induce their
governments to issue money, even though money bears no interest. See Tobin, Liquidity
Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 R. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958). There are, of course,
other reasons for holding money, including the need for a medium of payment for routine
services. See Baumol, The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach,
66 Q.J. EcoN. 545 (1952); Tobin, The Interest-Elasticity of Transactions Demand for Cash,
38 R. EcoN. & STATISTICS 241 (1956).
109. An analogous result would occur, for example, in a modern economy suffering hyper-
inflation. A recent example may be found in the experience of Germany during the hyperinflation
of the 1920's. Between November, 1918 and September, 1923 the exchange rate of marks to
dollars increased from 7.43 to 98,860,000, and ultimately reached I trillion. Dawson, Effects
of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171, 174 (1934). The
German legal system first turned to equitable doctrines of rescission, grounded upon a concept
of economic impossibility. This enabled courts to reset the substantive terms of a contract,
using a requirement of "good faith." Id. at 186. Rejecting legal tender rules, courts held that
previous payments in depreciated marks did not discharge debts, even past debts. It was argued
that in private contracts a qualitative equivalence was required between the parties' perform-
ances. This was deemed to be an essential attribute of bilateral contracts, and when it was
impaired or destroyed by supervening events (including inflation), judicial intervention was
required. Id. at 192-93. Courts tried to readjust the relationship between contracting parties
based on "good faith." See A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW 206-11 (rev. ed. 1950). In
effect, the legal system became a roving agency empowered to distribute goods in accordance
with the judiciary's particular point of view. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM 1094 (2d ed. 1977); see also id. at 1099 (quoting 1 K. LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES
SCHULDRECHTS § 2, pt. II, at 265 (11th ed. 1976)):
[One can speak of a legally recognizable disturbance of equilibrium when, as
a consequence of an unforeseen change of circumstances in a two-sided contract,
the reciprocal obligations have come into a "gross disproportion" so that the
contract no longer fulfills its purpose ... as an exchange .... [C]hanges in the
value relationship between performance and counterperformance can first be taken
into account when they rest on events that were not foreseen by the party affected,
with which one normally does not have to reckon in commerce. ...
However, courts recognized the problems inherent in this approach, and generally agreed
that if a fair revision could not be adduced, the contract would be rescinded upon the purchaser's
request. Dawson, supra, at 194.
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be free; the government would eventually have to balance its accounts, and
reduce the money supply, by taxation. But between its consumption and the
balancing of its accounts, the government would enjoy an interest-free loan
of the amount consumed. Currency can, therefore, be fairly characterized
as a bond bearing zero percent interest. Alternatively, the issuance of money
can be considered a form of taxation. Since the existence of currency enables
the government to enjoy consumption free of interest expense, it enjoys a
benefit exactly equal to a lump-sum tax in the amount of the interest expense
it would incur if it issued bonds. 10
The government is the beneficiary of such an interest-free bond issue. It
will encourage the use of its currency in order to increase the currency's
value. The more valuable the currency, the higher the level of interest-free
consumption available to the government. This description of the coin-miller's
profit does not depend on the existence of a public-spirited central authority
at Rome. The Roman legal system can be assumed to a be a mechanism for
the perpetuation of the welfare of the Roman elite at the expense of all other
classes. The main form of government consumption could be, for example,
the purchase of wine and Bacchanalia for the use of the Roman elite. In such
a case, the elite would favor interest-free consumption to the alternative, just
as it would if the government spent its revenues on a system of roads for
the use of farmers and tradesmen. By refusing to enforce the executory form
of permutatio, Roman law induced parties to contracts to denominate their
transactions in money. By effectively requiring the use of its money, the govern-
ment enjoyed the ownership, via the process of milling, of a credible medium
of exchange for its own transactions. Its consumption was thereby rendered
interest free.
CONCLUSION
Even after recognizing the enforceability of executory contracts of sale,
the Romans did not enforce an executory barter contract. Historians have
looked both outside the Roman legal system and inside, to the legal culture,
for an explanation for this seeming inconsistency. This article has attempted
to show that the historical and anthropological approaches have not satis-
In essence, in Germany during the 1920's, money became useless as a medium of exchange.
As a result, courts became unable to enforce executory contractual obligations because they
had no principled way to value those obligations.
110. Assume a balanced budget where constant consumption (C) equals constant tax revenue
(T): C = T. Suppose that the government issues a bond with revenue (R) and interest expense
(b), so that the net bond revenue is (R - b). Then, C + R - b = T + R - b. The government
can increase net bond revenue by paying no interest (b = 0), so that C + R = T + R. The
government can achieve exactly this result by holding net bond revenue (R - b) constant and
increasing tax revenue by (s), such that (s = b). In this case, C + R - b + s = T + R
- b + s. But since (-b + s) = 0, C + R = T + R, the result of not paying interest (b).
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factorily solved the problem of the unenforceability of executory barter. In
particular, the legal culture thesis, while a sufficient explanation in a strictly
conceptual sense, raises as many questions as it answers. The insights pro-
vided by economic analysis, by contrast, do make it possible to understand
why executory barter was not enforced.
The Roman system of law would not enforce executory barter contracts
because they tended to be Pareto inefficient and because the Roman gov-
ernment enjoyed a profit on the milling of Roman coinage. Two sources of
Pareto inefficiency resulting from the enforcement of executory barter have
been identified: bounded rationality and asymmetric transaction costs. Each
condition produces an equilibrium which could be improved by the inter-
vention of a third party. It should again be emphasized that although Pareto
efficiency is not a normative criterion, it is a desirable feature of a market
equilibrium regardless of the normative standard adopted by a society.
It is unlikely that the Romans articulated these economic concerns using
the language of modern economics. However, the Romans shared these
concerns, which they called by different names. We have, therefore, intro-
duced three characteristics of markets, each of which would provide a gov-
ernment with an incentive to encourage the use of money by discouraging
the use of executory barter.
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